UK-Japan Strategic Partnership

Hitotsubashi Policy Brief

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Executive Summary

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Contents

This report examines four key issues of the UK-Japan partnership, as follows.

I. Resurgence of Great Power Competition
   We start off by considering Japan and the UK’s position in face of the resurgence of great power politics on the international stage. Behind America’s hegemony in the post-Cold War era, there have been quiet but definite changes, such as the growth of China and the recovery of the Russian Federation. The UK and Japan must reevaluate their current foreign policy to take into account such changes. This paper questions what areas should be prioritized in this reconsideration process.
   As its economy grows, China has not only established a military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, but also has increased its economic strength by lending large amounts of money to developing countries in the name of ‘economic support’. Also, there have been substantial standoffs in the relationship between Russia and the West especially after the Ukrainian crisis, in which Russia’s assertiveness surprised the world. Russia is aiming to divide Europe by supporting authoritarian regimes. Also, Japan and the UK faces the modern hybrid warfare threats including cybersecurity issues.

II. BRI & FOIP
   In this section, we consider BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific), which are the two new emerging frameworks of engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. When comparing BRI and FOIP, there are similarities, and therefore some see these two concepts as competing. Similarities can be seen in connectivity (infrastructure), openness based on free trade, and supra-regional ambition. However, we found out that there are important differences, broadly ascribable to the divergence between the rule-based liberal order and the Chinese system. FOIP is trying to provide a more liberal impression by emphasizing cooperation, rule of law, and contribution to peace, etc., while BRI is focuses more directly on national interests. We argue that FOIP does not intend to overrule BRI as long as BRI ensures transparency and rule of law.

III. UK-Japan Security Cooperation
   In this chapter, we discuss two shared geopolitical interests between the UK and Japan: relationship with the US and their geographical positions surrounded by great powers,
namely China for Japan and Russia for the UK. In 2017, the UK and Japan concluded a new type of security alliance as established in the ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’. We analyze how both countries see each other as a partner in pursuing their own policies: for UK, ‘Global Britain’ vision by former Prime Minister May and for Japan, ‘Proactive contribution to peace’ by former Prime Minister Abe. A literature review on the topic highlights a widespread expectation that Japan-UK cooperation can become a key model for a ‘network-type alliance’ in support of the US, which used to function as the ‘hub’ of the region. However, we offer a different view: firstly, we suggest that the alliance itself is not new but the threats surrounding the alliance are; secondly, we cast doubts over whether Japan, which has constraints with its military activities, is truly able to move out of the US dominant hub-and-spoke system.

IV. North Korea
Lastly, we consider how Japan and the UK should deal with the issue of North Korea, which is unambiguously perceived as a major security threat for both countries and the East Asian region. North Korea threatens the regional security by carrying out nuclear tests and launching ballistic missiles, the potential impact of which would be massive. This chapter focuses on the US, which is the most important actor on this issue, and assesses why the latest negotiations broke down by analyzing the current interests of both the US and North Korea. While the US aims to achieve the complete denuclearization of North Korea, North Korea only seems to be interested in achieving a ‘symbolic denuclearization’, and this was the part of the reason why the negotiations collapsed.

“The Japan-UK relationship can become a key model for a new ‘network-type alliance’”

Policy Recommendations

I. **Share a vision and be ready for great power competition.** China and Russia have been seen as potential threats to the unipolar order led by the United States, and therefore the UK and Japan can and should cooperate in order to maintain the status quo. Therefore, in relation to Russia, we need to reevaluate the defensive policies to match the threats of hybrid warfare, to expand cybersecurity cooperation, and to support pro-Western parties in Eastern Europe. In relation to China, both the UK and Japan need to oppose and call out ‘debt trap’, as well as the recent human rights violations perpetrated by China. By
developing high-quality infrastructure, trade cooperation and maritime security, both countries can promote stability and economic growth in the Indo-Pacific region.

II. **Jointly work on engaging regional players in FOIP.** If competition of BRI and FOIP heightens, it could also result in great power rivalry within the region. No developing country wants great power rivalry to play out in their region. Avoiding competition with China and bringing China into liberal international order will benefit not only Japan but also the UK. For China too, collaborating with FOIP would bring certain incentives. Collaborating with FOIP means that China will show a commitment to international law, including other nations’ sovereignty. It would improve the international credibility of China and the quality of technology and infrastructural projects. Therefore, collaboration by China is desirable. In order to do so, there needs to be good relationship between the US and China. The UK and Japan can play an important role in facilitating such conversation. In the context of Brexit, there seems to be an increasing focus by the UK on the Indo-Pacific region. Asian states may view a more engaged UK along with other EU countries as a potential alternative to the US given the US’s uncertain leadership along with rising China.

III. **Deepen substantive and effective bilateral security cooperation.** Our paper touched upon the Japanese Constitutional debate, but mainly discussed the requirements for the exercise of collective self-defense and the relationship between the requirements of collective self-defense in the context of UK-Japan security cooperation. In 2017, the UK and Japan agreed on the Acquisition and Cross-servicing and Agreement (ACSA), which not only allows both countries to cooperate in natural disasters, joint exercises, and PKO but also allows the Japanese Self Defense Forces to supply ammunitions for British military forces even when Japan is not involved the conflict. The UK and Japan have conducted several joint exercises in both countries, but so far there is no status agreement between them. If the Japanese government wishes to operationalize ACSA effectively and trying to alleviate the tensions in the region, visiting forces agreement should be concluded as soon as possible.

IV. **Setting ‘denuclearization’ as a goal through a phased approach.** The US shifted its negotiation channel into one-on-one talks as multilateral frameworks failed. However, other countries such as South Korea, Japan, China and other Asian countries also have different opinions. They have to discuss the definition of denuclearization, and the appropriate balance between providing incentives to North Korea and facilitating the progress of denuclearization. From North Korea’s perspective, nuclear arms are the only peacekeeping weapons they have, making it too risky for them to abandon all their nuclear arms at once. Therefore we suggest phased denuclearization with the appropriate amount of incentives to North Korea.

Cover Picture: Wikimedia Commons
I. Resurgence of Great Power Competition in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of China and Russia

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1. Introduction

1.1. Defining ‘Power’

The United States has dominated international trade, politics, and culture for almost 30 years as the world’s only superpower. However in recent years two major players, Russia and China, have been amassing power and are currently in the position to challenge US hegemony. In analyzing the movements of these two countries, it is important to establish a working definition of power, as no country can make any global movements without it.

In the context of international relations, power is defined as the ‘ability to enact influence over other actors within the international system’, and is defined to two main types of power: hard and soft.

Hard power is defined as coercive, primarily using a state’s tangible resources to influence other actors. The main tools of hard power are a nation’s military and economic capabilities, using methods such as economic sanctions and trade agreements, as well as the threat of military action as both incentives and deterrents for international cooperation along its own agenda. In the context of US hegemony, an example of US’s hard power is its the size of its military, as it remains the most powerful one in the world.

In contrast to hard power, soft power is co-optive rather than coercive, and uses a nation’s culture, history, and foreign policy to affect other countries’ decisions and preferences. It is far more diplomatic and uses non-aggressive methods to get other countries to follow a superpower’s
agenda willingly. The example of the US’s soft power is the prevalence and popularity of US culture and products across the globe, with American multinational corporations such as McDonalds operating on every continent.

1.2. Research Question

With Russia and China both increasing their hard and soft power, US hegemonic power is being challenged on two fronts, with its spheres of influence in Asia being threatened too. The two countries have entered the global stage as new power players, each with the potential to rise as the new Asian superpower. In the event of such resurgence, the United Kingdom and Japan both must reevaluate their current foreign policy. This project shall question what changes should be considered in the face of the new potential world order.

2. The Cold War Era and its Aftermath

2.1. The Cold War Era

The Cold War Era can simply be defined as post-World War II tensions between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Past grievances between the two nations split the world into a bipolar power system, forcing other countries to choose a camp. The United States wanted to defend the democratic, capitalist, ‘free world order’, and made use of its soft and hard power to keep and attract allies in other parts of the world to meet this goal.

Prior to the Cold War, the United States had the strongest economy in the world, permitting the country to finance the Cold War using geo-economic measures. From 1947, the United States implemented a policy of containment in order to counter the threat of communist expansion on the economic front. Between 1950 and 1980, the US’s economic power was at its peak. In addition to economic strength, American culture and society based on freedom, free enterprise and consumption became a model for the rest of the world.

In the early years of the Cold War, the United States was the major military superpower. It established military bases in other countries, and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an intergovernmental military alliance between North American and European countries. Some of the US policies clearly invoked the use of force (endignment) while others were meant to pacify relations with communist nations (détente).

Two key points of the Cold War were the Arms Race and the Space Race, where the USSR and the US competed with each other both militarily and technologically. The two nations created powerful armies and with the latest war technologies and had a major conflict in 1962 in the
Cuban Missile Crisis and 1981 with the *Star Wars* programme. On the technological side during the *Space Race*, the Soviets put the first man into space in 1961, while the US landed the first man on the moon in 1969.

From 1942 to 1989, the United States appeared both as an economic, military and cultural superpower. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found itself without any rival.

### 2.2. Aftermath and US hegemony

The collapse of the Soviet Union had two major consequences: the formation of new nation states out of the ruins of former USSR territories, and the true beginning of US hegemony. In terms of foreign policy, the US entered an era of unprecedented global supremacy economically, culturally, militarily, and politically. The United States became entangled in a number of foreign regional conflicts such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda in an effort to guide these nations towards stability, taking on the role of ‘the world’s policeman’. Besides maintaining global stability and promoting democracy, the US focused on humanitarian and economic foreign policies, taking the lead on organizations and agreements such as NAFTA and WTO. After 9/11, the US turned its attention towards fighting international terrorism and again rebuilt its military and starting the War on Terror.

Despite the newly reformed Russian Federation mostly retaining its spheres of influence within the territory of the former USSR, it could no longer compete with the US on the global stage at the same level. Facing a number of political and social restructuring issues through the ’90s, by the late 2010s Russia regained some of its previous domestic and international power. Similarly, in the shadow of US hegemony, China slowly but surely began making its own place in the global economy by rapidly industrializing and becoming a major producer and exporter for other countries. From the view of the United States movements in both Russia and China are currently threatening US supremacy, and creating increasingly strained relations with the two countries. China is threatening US economic hegemony as the second largest economy, owning most of the United States’ international debt. China also is also making strides to further establish itself as the main power in Asia, threatening the security region that the US has established in Asia with its positions and alliances in Japan and South Korea. Russia has been active in the former USSR territories and has been specifically threatening US cyber security. Although China and Russia are both striving to gain more power internationally and could be considered rivals, China and Russia have a fairly close relations economically, politically, and militarily, both challenging the US hegemony and expansionism.
3. Present Era: Resurgence of China and Russia

3.1. The United States’ position in the world today

As one of the 29 states of NATO since its establishment in 1949, the US has played a major role on the international stage. As it is a political and military alliance, all the member states join the collective security system and at the same time have the duty to exercise rights of collective self-defence. In order to secure this system, NATO expects each member state to bear expenses according to its own economy, with contributions equaling 2% of a country’s GDP. The US, however, having consistently paid even more than this amount, has claimed that it is unfair and has requested to reduce its burden. The US bears approximately 22% NATO’s administrative and security costs, whereas comparatively Germany bears only 14.8%. Although NATO was established and led mainly by the US, the ratio and system of calculating expenses should be regularly revised. At the same time, should NATO actually accept the US’s request to reduce its financial burden, the balance of power within the alliance is subject to transform.

3.2. Russia’s position in the world today

Recently, relations between Russia and the West have been fairly tense. The main reason for the current confrontation is the West’s unwillingness to take into account Russia's national-state interests and to recognize the growth of Russia's role in international politics. Europe has not accepted Russia’s proposals to create a new collective system of European security, entailing a single economic and civilizational space ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. Also, a direct cause of the increased tensions between Russia and the West was the Ukrainian crisis, which was an amalgamation of a number of unresolved problems, contradictions and mutual claims of recent years. Therefore, Russia’s firm commitment to defending its national interests has largely resulted from an analysis of major geopolitical processes.

The international community’s attempts to isolate Russia have had limited success, as China and the vast majority of other non-Western states are not cooperating in the manner Russia likely desires. This is confirmed by the active cooperation through the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS, as well as the treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union that is coming into force. In addition, there are many reasons – global challenges, threats, acute international problems and basic common sense – for establishing relations and seeking compromise with the Western world.

Russia's foreign policy success will largely be determined by the success of transformation within the country on the domestic level. The most important factor would be a success in the economic transformation of the country, the necessity of which is more urgent than ever. The development
of its own economic potential along with technological and innovative breakthroughs, are necessary to increase of competitiveness of the Russian economy. There will be no external policy without any effective domestic one.

3.3. China's position in the world today

From around 1978 China began efforts to reform its economy, and found great success and rapid growth. China is now the second largest economy in the world, following behind the US. Scholars have practically reached a consensus that China is on the rise, or entering a new renaissance. However, the position of China, or more precisely the relationship between China and the West has changed as a result of this economic growth.

From 2017, the position of China in the world clearly started to change, and as a result the US's attitude towards China began to change as well. For the past several decades, China was viewed as a weaker country that could be democratized through interaction or communication with capitalist and democratic nations. Within the USA's greater sphere of alliances, compared to Russia, China was viewed as malleable and susceptible to change. Generally speaking, the situation now is not much better than the situation from a few decades ago. However, China has realized that it is now in the position to act as a bigger player in international politics. Xi Jinping's administration is much more active and vigorous than that of his predecessors, with China attempting to become a leader in both East and South-East Asia.

The biggest challenge to becoming the premier power in this region is the fact that there is already a leader, the US. The competition and possible confrontation between China and the US in this region has become inevitable. In East Asia, it would be difficult to challenge or weaken the alliances between the US and Japan and the US and Korea. In contrast, the US has less influence in South-East Asia and it is much easier for China to develop deeper relations with South-East Asian countries. Although South-East Asian countries are willing to have more trade and investment with China, some countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia are cautious, questioning China's intentions. Earning their trust is also an objective for China.

4. Current Strategic Interests and Strategies

4.1. On Russia

4.1.1. Security and Politics

After being suspended from the G8 meeting in 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea, Russia's relationship with the West worsened. NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe has made Russia raise its guard, starting a counter-strategy in the Black-sea region to restore influence along its
periphery and limit integration of regional states into the Euro-Atlantic community.

The occupation and militarization of Crimea, the modernization of the Black Sea Fleet, and the expansion of forces in the Southern Military District have all contributed to strengthening Russia’s leverage and power projection capabilities into the region. The divergent interests among targeted countries make it difficult for the West to find an effective countermove.

Russia’s regional ambitions are increasing, but it lacks the means to achieve them directly. In order to pose a challenge to the west-centered international system, Russia has been allegedly financing and supporting far-right populist parties in Europe, as well as interfering in the 2016 US elections.

4.1.2. Economy and ties with China

Sanctions imposed in 2014 triggered a 3-year recession in Russia. Russia and the EU, despite this, are important trade partners: the EU accounts for 42.8% of Russia’s trade, and Russia is the largest oil and gas exporter to the EU. However, Russia faces obstacles in becoming a major energy supplier to the Asia-Pacific, as both Japan and South Korea are allied with the West, and their businesses are discouraged from cooperating with their Russian counterparts.

Such sanctions are making Russia tighten its bond with China. China is now Russia’s largest trading partner, and cooperation is at an unprecedented level. Energy plays an important role here as well, with the ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline reaching completion by December 2019. There have also been arms deals and high-profile joint military exercises between the countries. In July 2019, the two conducted their first-ever joint air patrol exercise, and a comprehensive military agreement is in the process of being developed.

“In East Asia, it would be difficult [for China] to challenge or weaken the US-Japan and US-ROK alliance. In contrast, the US has less influence in South-East Asia and it is much easier for China to develop deeper relations with South-East Asian countries.”
4.2. On China

4.2.1. China’s ambitions and goals

Becoming the global hegemon is not what China aspires to. Unraveling the current world order is not necessarily in China’s interest, considering the benefits it enjoys within the status quo. For example, China holds permanent membership in the UN Security Council, allowing it to have a strong say in the global decision-making process. Rather than bearing the high costs of establishing an entirely new world system, China would rather continue its current ‘pick-and-choose’ approach: supporting the existing order in some areas while undermining it in others.

This does not mean that China lacks regional ambitions; in areas surrounding Asia, China seeks to displace the U.S. and expand its own sphere of influence. China’s aim on the world stage is merely to become a superpower next to the U.S., but its aim in the region is to become the superpower. By consolidating regional supremacy, China ultimately seeks to secure its most fundamental interest – the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.

4.2.2. China’s actions and strategies

In order to dilute American influence and bolster its position in Asia and beyond, China leverages both its military and economic power.

China demonstrates its coercive capabilities most evidently in the South China Sea (SCS). Asserting and defending its regional claims in the SCS is one of China’s important national goals, because the SCS is important not only as a trade route but also because of its abundant oil and gas reserves. Since 2013, China has been ramping up its construction activities in the SCS. Under the name of defense-capability building, China is gaining greater presence and control in the SCS.

The most obvious example of China using its economic power is the Belt and Road Initiative. Countries in the relevant regions are increasingly relying on China for investment for two reasons; abundance and unconditionality. No other country is capable of providing money on such a grand scale with so few requirements. By capitalizing on other countries’ needs for quick money, China seeks to diminish the influence of Western powers. In other words, China’s strategy is to win over support from the regional countries by presenting itself as the most viable source of economic support, and this method seems to be succeeding. Beneficiaries of the BRI are aligning themselves with China, contributing to prevent the formation of an anti-China front on the SCS issue.
4.3. On the US

4.3.1. Economic interests and policies

Threatened by China’s rapid economic growth, the US is currently struggling to balance the traditional free trade regime with market intervention. The US and China are involved in a heated trade war concerning technological transfer, intellectual property, and especially farm products. President Trump demands that China purchase as much as $50 billion of US farm products, which is double the current amount. Protecting farmers and labor rights by intentionally adjusting tariffs is essential to realize ‘America First’. US trade policy is thus self-contradictory.

4.3.2. Security interests and policies

On one hand, the US and China may be good partners to each other; on the other hand, they compete through power politics. The US and China share the goal of ensuring safety in the sea route to Africa via India and are also cooperating for anti-piracy efforts. However the US is threatened by the expansion of Chinese power in the Indo-pacific, as China is planning to build naval bases in Africa. China criticizes the US because its ‘Freedom of navigation’ can seriously harm its sovereignty and security interest. Thus, the US maintains its commitment to the Asia-Pacific to secure its influence over South-Eastern Asia through financial and military cooperation.

The US-Russia relationship will be the focal matter because Russia is returning as a major global and European power for the following reasons: its nuclear power, natural resources, power in the UN Security Council, and its influence in the regions that previously were part of the Soviet Union. The US bolstered US and NATO military capabilities in Europe for the purpose of deterring future Russian aggression after the Ukraine incident. Cooperation with NATO countries will continue to further stabilize the Western order. However there is always the concern that the US will withdraw its troops, as in the current Syrian-Turkish border dispute.

5. Policy Recommendations for UK-Japan Cooperation

5.1. In relation to Russia

As discussed above Russia poses numerous challenges to UK-Japan cooperation and the western world in general. The most discussed of these are in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea which, between the two countries, is rather a British concern than Japanese. However, both countries can and should cooperate in order to maintain the status quo. To counteract Russia’s ambitions in these regions, both countries need to initiate and actively participate in a modernization of the defensive strategy in the Eastern European theatre to better match the threat of modern hybrid warfare. Various researchers point to the need for more active use of political and legislative
influence. Additionally to contain the Black Sea Fleet, securing the enmity of Turkey against Russia is key to not letting this fleet into the Mediterranean Sea, where it might pose a threat to NATO’s dominance in the region.

The Kremlin is aware of this obvious hindrance to its power projection and therefore seeks to support authoritarian regimes in Europe, expecting these regimes to cooperate with Russia. This can be seen with Erdogan in Turkey or Orbán in Hungary. This second challenge can be met by both the UK and Japan politically supporting pro-western politicians in Eastern Europe and helping economically develop these countries.

The reason for Moscow’s support for these regimes is the fact that a disjointed Europe with internal conflicts of interest prevents European countries from resisting Russia’s goals and ambitions. This is demonstrated by the limited effect of sanctions against Russia as discussed in Section 3.2. A consolidated Europe is hardly imaginable without a common vision whose incentives might outweigh the incentives to accept Russian influence on European politics. This vision would have to be well communicated to make it more appealing than populist parties.

As mentioned in previous sections, Russia is being accused of spreading misinformation via the internet and using the means of cyberwarfare to influence politics of western nations. A common cyber-defence initiative or perhaps a NATO-wide one would help to face this challenge.

5.2. In relation to China

As previously stated, China has an ambition to gain regional hegemony, and there are many challenges that need to be solved associated with this. Geographically, this is a bigger concern for Japan due to its proximity to the region. To maintain and improve the current situation, both Japan and the UK should cooperate.

As described in Section 3.3, the biggest concern is that China will try to gain regional hegemony. This will ensure the Chinese Communist Parties legitimacy in Asia. However, by strengthening the cooperative relationship between the UK and Japan, this regional expansion can be opposed. Strengthening the scope of security between these two countries is essential. Until recently, the UK has been focusing solely on security in Europe but should extend its focus towards the Asian region and extend its influence there. Japan too should oppose China and its expansive actions in the region, in coordination with the UK.

China is now claiming dominance in the South China Sea. In order to secure the South China Sea’s important trade routes and abundant natural resources they continue to expand, looking to find a strategic advantage in the region.
Although this has been criticized by many countries in the world for breaking international law, China is continuing to expand and construct its military bases in the SCS. To counter this, both Japan and the UK need to cooperate militarily. Specifically, by further expanding the activities of the British Army and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force currently dispatched in the SCS, it would possible to deny China’s assertion and restrain it.

China has not only established a military base in the Indo-Pacific region, but also has increased its economic strength by lending large amounts of money to developing countries in the name of ‘economic support’. For example, in Sri Lanka, China has begun to fund the development of ports. They have lent money to the Sri Lankan government with an aim to acquire the rights to these ports by incentivizing the reductions in debt repayments. Both the UK and Japan need to oppose and call out this type of economic funding, as well as their recent human rights violations perpetrated by China. By developing high-quality infrastructure, trade cooperation and maritime security both countries can promote stability and economic growth in the Indo-Pacific region.

As mentioned in Section 4.2, China is steadily promoting BRI mainly in the South China Sea and Indo-Pacific. In order to hold China accountable it would be desirable for another superpower, like the United States, to strengthen ties with both the UK and Japan. More so, they share similar values, and the UK has a preexisting alliance with the US which would facilitate this process. Lastly, the key to addressing current problems in the region due to China’s hegemony is a deeper cooperation between UK-Japan in defense matters, and clearly center this partnership in the Indo-Pacific region.

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II. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative: Competing Strategic Visions?

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1. Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative: the new Asian regional order?

1.1. Free and Open Indo-Pacific

‘Indo-Pacific’ generally refers to a geographical concept that includes the span of Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. This is the most dynamic region of the world, from a strategic, economic and political viewpoint. Evidently, in recent years, the concept has become increasingly prominent as a geopolitical construct for the foreign policy of major powers, namely the United States, Australia, India and Japan, expanding and replacing the traditional use of the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, which dominated the discourse for decades.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is a strategy which was first announced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his keynote address at Tokyo International Conference on African Development VI held in Kenya, in August 2016. FOIP aims at reconfirmation of the order of security and economy. The concept of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is not new and Japan has referred to ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept and develop it over a decade. In 2006, Prime Minister Abe has mentioned ‘Arc of freedom and prosperity’ at Japan Institute of International Affairs. In 2007, Prime Minister Abe gave the speech ‘confluence of the two seas’ at the Indian Parliament, describing the Pacific and Indian Ocean as

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2 Pooja Bhatt “Evolving Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Deliberating India’s Position.” Journal of Indo-Pacific
‘a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity’. During second Abe administration, in 2012, He announced an idea ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’ strategy. This concept says that Australia, India, Japan and US form a security diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific. In 2013, Abe made a speech on ‘The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy’, in which he made his idea of security diamond milder and provided Japan’s maritime strategy.

FOIP is a strategy with two main concepts. The first concept is ‘Diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map’ and the second one is ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ based on the principle of international cooperation. Japan intends to further improve and expand these diplomatic concepts. Japan regards this strategy as a 'key for stability and prosperity of the international community'. This strategy links two continents, Asia and Africa, and encompasses two oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, striving to improve connectivity between the two continents and promote stability and prosperity of the region.

The main aim of this strategy is to develop free and open maritime order in the Indo Pacific region as ‘international public good’, bringing stability and prosperity for every country as well as securing peace and prosperity in the region. Japan says that it will cooperate with any country that supports this idea.

Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy consists of three pillars:

1. Promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation and free trade, etc.
2. Pursuit of economic prosperity (improving connectivity, etc.)
3. Commitment for peace and stability (capacity building on maritime law enforcement, HA/DR cooperation, etc.)

Since 2017 the concept ‘Indo-Pacific’ started to gain momentum in the China and Asia Pacific discourse. In particular, the United States, under Trump presidency, began discussing about Indo-Pacific since October 2017, when then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson outlined the new administration’s approach with India under the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) vision. Later, the United States released National Security Strategy in December, detailing Indo-Pacific as a top priority of its strategic agenda, surpassing the Middle East, which has dominated the attention of previous US administrations for a long time.

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3 Jamie Fly “Trump’s Asia Policy and the Concept of the Indo-Pacific.” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (October 2, 2018)
More recently, in June 2019, the United States’ Defense Department released Indo-Pacific Strategy Report to elaborate its plan for the region.\(^5\) Similarly, in the same year, Australian government released, for the first time in 14 years, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, focusing on the power shifts in Indo-Pacific region and Australia’s role in supporting FOIP vision.\(^6\) As for India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi put forth India’s vision of Indo-Pacific in 2018 Shangri La dialogue, with similar views on the region as aforementioned countries.\(^7\) However, India has a distinctive approach to FOIP, instead of focusing on ‘Free and Open’, India emphasizes ‘Inclusiveness’ in FOIP’s core values with an intention to include China in the FOIP discourse.

All four countries mentioned above have one thing in common: they are all maritime powers with immense interest in the region and all experience the Chinese threat. The four leading countries in promoting Indo-Pacific are called the Quad, reviving the 2007 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Since 2017, the Quad has formally at Deputy Foreign Minister level meeting three times under the name ‘US - Australia - India - Japan Consultations’.\(^8\) This is because India is uncomfortable in working under the Quad framework, and preferred to engage bilaterally, trilaterally, or quadrilateral level, and is very careful in not overstepping existing political architectures, such as the East Asia Summit.\(^9\) Nevertheless, the Quad countries still shared common goals in the Indo-Pacific vision: to maintain fundamental principles of international orders with respect to sovereignty and independence of all nations, to improve connectivity in all areas and free and fair reciprocal trade, and to ensure commitment to international rules and norms for peace and stability, including the freedom of navigation, anti-terrorism, humanitarian assistance and more.\(^10\)

1.2. Belt and Road Initiative

In China, since the birth of Xi administration in 2012, Xi has tried to turn the abstract ‘Chinese Dream’ idea into a kind of practical policy in the context of developing Chinese economic and military power. Recognizing the relative decline of US power, the CCP launched the concept of Belt

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\(^5\) The Department of Defense “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting A Networked Region.” (June 1, 2019)

\(^6\) Australian Government “2017 Australian Foreign Policy White Paper” (2017)


\(^9\) Satu Limaye “India-East Asia Relations: India Continues Involvement and Integration with the Indo-Pacific/East Asia in 2018.” Comparative Connections, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 117-126

and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2014. The idea of Chinese Dream contained two perspective on the policy making. First, China should re-construct institutional environment that is profitable for Chinese development through promoting cooperation with other countries (especially Asian countries). This perspective regards the economic interdependence as important relationship. Second, however, Xi said China would get rid of that ‘good’ relationship under some special situations. Under BRI, China has six core agendas: sovereignty, safety, border, CCP, unification and sustainable development, and China insisted that they would maintain a firm stance against anything that indicates to infringe on those values such as the territorial dispute in the South China Sea. In sum, we can see the Chinese double-standard feature about its internal and external policy that has strongly influenced BRI policy.

1.3. Indo-Pacific: Chinese containment policy?

Inevitably, China’s growing influence through BRI projects and aggressive posture in Indo-Pacific theater has raised concerns among major powers. China has long been in ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China seas with its neighbors. In the South China Sea, China wants the control over one of the most important sea lanes in the world for its own defense, amidst the presence of United States, its rival power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. However, China’s claim over the South China Sea came in conflict with its Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, claiming overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZ) within the region. Besides, the South China Sea is also crucial to other countries that may not be directly involved with the dispute, given its importance as one of the most important sea lanes for crude oil transports. In order to establish control in the South China Sea, China has built its military presence and bases on the artificially constructed islands in the area. China’s maritime assertiveness is indeed a real threat to many countries, especially maritime powers that rely on freedom of navigation and overflights, such as Japan and the United States.

In addition to China’s maritime aggression in the Pacific Ocean, China’s growing presence in Indian Ocean also raised concerns among many major powers. China has two priorities in securing its presence in Indian Ocean: to safeguard the transportation of energy supplies from the Middle East as a primary priority, and to enhance its status as a major regional power as a secondary priority. As a result, China has initiated multiple infrastructure and commercial projects as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South and Central Asia. China has invested

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11 Christopher Roberts “The South China Sea: Beijing’s Challenge to ASEAN and UNCLOS and the Necessity of a New Multi-tiered Approach.” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (August 29, 2017)
in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Burma. It is apparent that China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean has raised concerns for major powers in the region such as India and the United States. Therefore, many scholars have considered the uncontended presence of China in East and South China seas, and the growing predominance in Indian Ocean, as one of the major causes behind the emergence of the Indo-Pacific concept, which aims to establish a rule-based order and freedom of navigation in maritime domain.

In addition to China’s increasingly aggressive posture in both the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, the competitive relationship in recent years between Washington and Beijing also contributed hugely to the Indo-Pacific discourse. The Trump administration has taken a striking different approach toward China from the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia. In the late 2017, the United States released its National Security Strategy paper labelling China as a revisionist power, following Trump administration’s harder stance toward China, stemming from the belief that China has economically taken advantage of the United States. The paper states that a ‘geopolitical competition between free and repressive vision of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific’, and identifies how ‘China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor’. This shows that the United States views China as a prime competitor in the Indo-Pacific region.

2. FOIP and BRI: Competing Strategic Visions or Venues for Collaboration?

2.1. Competing strategic visions

FOIP and BRI represent respectively the United States-led regional vision versus the Chinese-led regional vision. It would be naïve to not consider the potential competitive nature of the two concepts, as they are backed by the two largest economies in the history of mankind. We look at potential areas of competition: firstly, we examine how areas of interests for FOIP and BRI are similar and whether there is potential for competition in the first place. Both BRI and FOIP concept are very economical in nature, advocating the vitalization of economic activities throughout the region. Specifically, both concepts envision region-wide connectivity based on investment on soft and hard infrastructures, advocating openness based on free trade, and both

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14 Ibid.
rely on supra-regional ambition as the geographical framework of operation. The supra-regional nature underscores the difference between the two concepts from previous regional conceptions.\textsuperscript{16}

However, despite similar approaches to regional and economic ambitions, the underlying principles of FOIP and BRI contain striking differences. FOIP ascribes to the international liberal order with high emphasis on freedom of navigation, while BRI is an expression of the Chinese view of regional order. In fact, some argue, FOIP attempts to prevent China from emerging as a new hegemonic country with too much power. This view is reinforced by China’s increasing maritime assertiveness and growing influence in South Asia and Southeast Asia, coupled with questionable loaning practices that induce the ‘debt trap’ phenomenon mentioned above. In this sense, these differences of principle can be a room for a potential competition between Chinese style order and international liberal order. As a result, the FOIP and BRI can be viewed as a competition between the two different underlying principles.\textsuperscript{17}

Beside the difference in principle, there are further noticeable areas of competition present under the two visions.

First, intensifying maritime competition and major power competition. One of the features of FOIP is QUAD that consists of Japan, the US, Australia, and India. This security alliance works as a key in the maritime security dimension of Indo-Pacific. Working as a guardian for the liberal maritime order, this alliance can counter the emerging power-based maritime order led by BRI. These two alliances clash in Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Additionally, competition for hegemonic power between the US and China leads to competition of FOIP and BRI. It is expected that Japan, South Korea and India work as balancers.

Second, there is a notable increase in strategic influence on their energy, digital commerce, maritime infrastructure, and focus on high technology industries. As a matter of fact, influence on these areas from both strategy is getting bigger and bigger. For example, in digital commerce, China is trying to make a ‘digital silk road’ that aims to furnish 5G on the Belt. Using this faster technology, China is laying the ground for high technology markets operating in fields such as telemedicine and internet finance, which are highly appealing to Asian nations with low rates of bank account holders. On the other hand, President Trump claims the US superiority on the technology field.

\textsuperscript{16}OECD “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape.” OECD Business and Finance Outlook (2018)

It is possible that Chinese companies, sensing this geopolitical rivalry, might increasingly begin making foreign direct investment (FDI) and production decisions that are focused more on China’s regional allies. For its part, the US might expect its partners to do likewise in the FOIP.

2.2. Opportunity for collaboration

While we know from the explanation above that FOIP and BRI undeniably have a competitive nature, some researchers have pointed out opportunities for collaboration between FOIP and BRI. India and Japan have maintained positive posture toward China. Prime Minister Abe in his Policy Speech to the Diet on January 22, 2018 said ‘…we will also work with China to meet the growing infrastructure demand in Asia’. Japan also emphasized that Japan’s vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific would be inclusive of China. Collaboration between FOIP and BRI is possible, especially if we see these two as a ‘constellation’: it is not a single cohesive strategy. There are a lot of independent projects within FOIP and BRI. The projects within might not be confronting each other and, as Prime Minister Abe said, can work together to meet the infrastructure demand in Asia and Africa.

“No developing country wants great power rivalry to play out in their backyard, as it would jeopardize the stability of the region and its economic development.”

Other reasons for this cooperation are based on assumption that we should also consider the perspective of countries of interest, namely Asian and African countries. Most of these are developing countries who are interested in BRI and FOIP because of the economic advantages they could draw from both to boost their economy. For example, ASEAN has been keen on joining the BRI since its inception and the primary objective of it was to receive China’s financial assistance for infrastructure development in the region. However, continuing competition between BRI and FOIP may make both programs undesirable for them. Initially bringing FOIP in the region might be a pursuit of a balance among major power in the region. But, if the competition of BRI and FOIP heightens, it might also bring great power rivalry to the region. No developing country wants great power rivalry to play out in their backyard, as it would jeopardize the stability of the region and its economic development. We have seen this kind of fear of great power rivalry in Southeast Asia by observing how ASEAN put out their own definition of FOIP to ensure a healthy environment for competition between FOIP and BRI.

There also some incentives for both China or QUAD member countries to further consider the cooperation between BRI and FOIP. For China, collaborating with FOIP would bring certain
incentives. First, it would ease the debt trap criticism. One of the primary reasons of this criticism was Sri Lanka’s handing over of control of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year ultra-long-term lease as it could not repay its debt to China. As a result, some countries who initially showed interest in BRI changed their posture as they began to link BRI and territorial sovereignty. Collaborating with FOIP means that China would still have a commitment to international law, including other nations’ sovereignty. Secondly, it would improve the international credibility of the Chinese market. Third, it would improve the quality of technology and infrastructural projects. Cooperating with FOIP will increase the probability of technology and knowledge transfer between China and other QUAD member countries. For QUAD members, collaboration between FOIP and BRI would ensure liberal order and engagement in Asia, the objective that is often mentioned by them. It would also create a healthy environment for competition. Some would say that QUAD will achieve their competitive strategy by using cooperative strategy.

3. How to ensure collaborative environment between FOIP and BRI?

In order to make sure that FOIP and BRI are collaborative, there needs to be a good relationship between the US and China. To do so it will be important to solve the current trade war, manage China’s maritime assertiveness, and safeguard the liberal international order so that any conflicts between the participating nations could be avoided.

First, to solve the current trade war, intervention from countries like Japan which holds healthy relationships with both China and the US is needed to bring the two countries together. For the moment, the US has been criticizing unfair trade practices by China, while China has been blaming US’s tough sanctions, but this has not led to the end of the trade war. Concretely a third party country could create opportunities for the conflicting nations to discuss that would hopefully lead to an agreement.

Secondly, solving China’s maritime assertiveness is crucial to create the ideal environment for the FOIP and BRI to be collaborative. Currently China is having many geopolitical issues with its surrounding nations due to its maritime assertiveness. The countries in question are acting on their own, not leading to any fundamental solutions. For example, ASEAN countries have been performing military operations while the Philippines have been appealing to The Hague permanent court of arbitration. These issues should be solved through the building of a new rule or agreement among the South China Sea countries, promising fairness and security to all its members. The common point between the first and second recommendation is to make a conversation. Especially in the first recommendation, Japan can be the best mediator between
the two countries because Japan is the third in the number of international patent applications all over the world.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, despite the expanding conservatism, liberal international order is necessary to operate international agreements like FOIP and BRI. Therefore Japan, as a third party should promote liberal international order to encourage nations to participate in and join both FOIP and BRI for collaboration.

\textbf{3.1. Implications for Europe}

The UK may seek expanded trade relations in the Indo-Pacific region following the pending withdrawal from the European Union (‘Brexit’). During the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore in 2018, Gavin Williamson, the UK Secretary of State for Defense stated, ‘Standing united with allies is the most effective way to counter the intensifying threats we face from countries that don’t respect international rules. Together with our friends and partners we will work on a more strategic and multinational approach to the Indian Ocean region – focusing on security, stability and environmental sustainability to protect shared prosperity’ (CRS, 2).

A Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation pledging to enhance global security partnership was made between UK Prime Minister Theresa May and Japanese Prime Minister Abe back in August 2017. In 2018, three Royal Navy ships were deployed in the Indo-Pacific region. One of them, HMS Argyll, and Japan’s largest warship, the Kaga helicopter carrier, held joint exercises in the Indian Ocean in September 2018 along with joint exercises in central Japan in October 2018. The UK also has ties to numerous states across the Indo-Pacific such as the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), which is a regional security group made up of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK that was established in 1971. In 2013, Australia and the UK signed a new Defense and Security Cooperation Treaty that enhances the framework for bilateral defense and builds on through the FPDA along with intelligence cooperation through the Five Eyes group that includes Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. These are certain indications of the UK’s increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific region although resource constraints and competing priorities could limit the degree to which the UK engages in the Indo Pacific.

France is another European country that has extensive interests in the Indo-Pacific region. France has 1.5 million French citizens living in French Indo-Pacific territories and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 9 million square kilometers. In March 2018, France and India expanded their

strategic partnership and have agreed to hold biannual summits and ‘agreed to deepen and strengthen the bilateral ties based on shared principles and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights’ (CRS, 2). France is also developing its bilateral strategic and defense relationships with Australia, Japan, and Vietnam. Australia and France agreed to work together on cyberterrorism and defense as DCNS, a French company, was awarded a $36.3 billion contract to build 12 submarines for Australia. President Macron and Prime Minister Abe agreed to increase their cooperation to promote stability in the Indo-Pacific during Abe’s visit to France in October 2018. Vietnam, France’s former colony, signed a Defense Cooperation Pact in 2009 and upgraded relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2013. Bilateral cooperation from France and the UK could develop a platform where other European countries might become more engaged in the Indo-Pacific. Regional states may view a more engaged Europe as a potential alternative to the US and its uncertain leadership along with rising China.

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III. UK-Japan Security Cooperation

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1. Introduction: Overview of UK-Japan security cooperation

In 2017, the UK and Japan concluded the ‘Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation’. In this declaration, they agreed to strengthen security cooperation in 17 areas, clearly indicating that both the British and the Japanese government regard such cooperation as quite important for their national security.

This paper examines the background and significance of UK-Japan security cooperation and how the two countries should develop this relationship from now on. Firstly, we provide an overview of UK-Japan security cooperation, analyzing its background and challenges. After that, we turn to Japan’s other security cooperation arrangements in order to identify what is needed to make the current UK-Japan security cooperation successful. Finally, we discuss whether their current partnership can be described as ‘new type of alliance’.

We take a historical approach to assessing the background of the UK and Japan’s security cooperation, roughly following this timeline: 1600 is the beginning of the UK-Japan relationship. William Adams was the one who first took contact with the Japanese, on the shores of Kyushu. However, no formal nor significant security cooperation was ever made between Japan and the UK until until the early 1900s: in 1900, the UK and Japan agreed to establish security cooperation, and in 1902 the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, largely with the purposes of mutual assistance with China and Korea, and to overcome the threat of Russia. However, this was valid only until for 20 years.

Moving into the contemporary era, 2004 was a particularly significant year, as the Japanese and British defence ministers signed a ‘Memorandum’, a type of note, which related to the Defence Cooperation. Then in 2012, there was the UK-Japan Summit held in Tokyo, with Prime minister David Cameron visiting Japan. The Vice-Minister of Defence in Japan and UK defence minister came to agree on the Japan-UK Defence cooperation Memorandum, in order to create a stronger
bond of cooperation. January 2015 saw the first ‘2+2’ meeting taking place in London, during which Japan and the UK reaffirmed the ‘dynamic strategic partnership’ between the two countries. Finally in August 2017, Japan and UK achieved a joint declaration on Security Cooperation under the administrations of Shinzo Abe and Theresa May respectively. Through this cursory overview of Japan-UK relations, we can see that it took almost 400 years for them to create a strong security cooperation bond since their first encounter.

The section below expands on this background and examines the security situation from a different point of view, looking into 2 essential parts of UK-Japan security cooperation: the military aspect and the information aspect. On the military side, 2 key events are worth noting: the signing of a ‘Transfer of Defence Equipment’ and a ‘Technology Bilateral Agreement’ in 2013, and the joint exercise with the UK army held in Japan in October 2018. As for information sharing, we show that the practice is still limited as Japan and UK have different strategic goals.

2. Background and challenges of UK-Japan security cooperation

In this section, we examine the main foreign policy directions of Japan and the UK, and then outline their shared interests.

Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe proposed the concept of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ in Japan’s National Security Strategy.¹ By this policy, Japan emphasizes the proactive cooperation with other countries in order to promote peace in both regional and global societies.² In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan recognizes the importance of European countries as partners because they share common interests, policies, and democratic values with Japan. The UK takes a similar position.³ Former prime minister Theresa May launched the ‘Global Britain’ vision, based on the idea that UK will engage not only European countries, but will also look all over the world for economic and diplomatic opportunities.⁴ In addition to that, Brexit also encourages UK to reassess the distribution of strategic interests and look to other areas like the Arab Gulf, Singapore and East Asia.

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² 英国(グレートブリテン及び北アイルランド連合王国) 外務省 https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/uk/data.html#section5 (参照 2019/11/28)
Therefore, both Japan and the UK have begun to realize the significance of global connections and the need for new partners in other parts of the world. This gives rooms for harmonizing their foreign policies. In fact, the UK and Japan share several geopolitical interests.

The first is their relationship with the US. Both the UK and Japan are allied and are cooperating with US deeply in many aspects, such as diplomacy, economy, and military affairs. However, in these days the US’s power is relatively declining, and its influence is not as strong as before. Given this situation, Japan-UK cooperation, through a triangular relationship with US, can greatly contribute to the peace and stability of the world. Moreover, their cooperation is important for a new type of alliance. Previously, the major form of alliance is 'hub and spokes' in which one 'hub' country allies with many ‘spoke’ countries. One example of this is the relationship between US and Asia-Pacific states. However, the problem with this connection is that it is difficult for spokes countries to cooperate strategically with each other. Therefore, from 2000s many countries recognize the importance of relations between spoke countries. This type of alliance is called 'network-type alliance'. Japan-UK cooperation would be the core model of this alliance and will support the US.

The second shared interest is related to their geographical position. Both countries are located on the edge of Eurasia and have great powers nearby: China for Japan, Russia for the UK. These days China and Russia, which could be seen as Eurasian 'land powers', are increasing their own influence and use force in their relations with other countries. From the perspective of geopolitics, in order to counter and deter these 'land powers', it is essential for ‘sea powers’ or island countries like UK and Japan to cooperate each other. By cooperating, they can contribute to not only their own security but also the peace and stability of global society.

3. Comparison with other security cooperation frameworks

We now draw a comparison between UK-Japan security cooperation and two other security cooperation frameworks: a contemporary one, namely the Japan-Australia security cooperation, and a historic one, that is the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902.

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5 秋元千明「多層な安全保障協力の構築と「新日英同盟」─今後の日本の外交安全保障戦略─」一般社団法人平和政策研究所 https://ippjapan.org/archives/1234 (参照 2019/11/21)

6 秋元千明「今なぜ日英同盟「復活」なのか 膨張する中国とロシアに「平和と安定の正三角形」で対峙」 WEDGE Infinity https://wedge.ismedia.jp/articles/-/11778 (参照 2019/11/21)

7 Ibid.

Australia is one of the most important regional security partners for Japan. Australia and Japan cooperate in security field by 2+2 meeting, ACSA, GSOMIA, and bilateral military exercises. There are some similarities between UK-Japan security cooperation and Japan-Australia security cooperation.\(^9\) They share security concerns such as increased pressure by China’s rise in power, and complicated alliance with the US.

There are three further similarities: the promotion of FOIP; being not an alliance but rather an alignment with joint security declaration; and having an economic partnership. With respect to VFA, both the UK and Australia keep negotiating with Japan. On the other hand, there is also a big difference between them. Japan-Australia cooperation predates the UK-Japan cooperation. The history of Japan-Australia security cooperation\(^10\) is longer than UK-Japan’s one: the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan was concluded in 1976. In addition, Japan and Australia made Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, which was Japan’s first security declaration with a country other than the US.\(^11\)

A comparison with Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, which was Japan’s first military alliance, can also be productive.\(^12\) Both the UK and Japan were afraid of Russia’s southward policy, with the result of the UK abandoning isolationism and concluding the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Through World War I, the UK and the US became cautious of Japanese colonialism in China, culminating with the alliance being abolished at Washington Naval Conference in 1921. The common features of Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902 and the current UK-Japan cooperation are its objective – counter-Russia – and its priority – safeguarding regional security in Asia. On the other hand, there are two differences. First, Anglo-Japanese alliance was a wartime military alliance, so they had reciprocal responsibility to protect each other. Second, the former one did not regard China as a threat while the latter one does. However, judging from an aspect of confronting landpower, they have similar structure despite the different country perceived as a threat.

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\(^9\) 増田剛『日豪「準同盟化」の狙い(時論公論)』NHK  
https://www.nhk.or.jp/kaisetsu-blog/100/309495.html（参照 2019/12/6）

\(^10\) "Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan." Australian Government  

\(^11\) "安全保障協力に関する日豪共同宣言"外務省  
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/australia/visit/0703_ks.html（参照 2019/12/6）

\(^12\) See footnote 8.
4. A New Type of Alliance?

4.1. Characteristics and criticism

Alliance refers to ‘a formal and informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’. This security cooperation is commonly viewed as ‘a response to threat’. The UK and Japan, through their long history of alliances, once shared the common strategic purpose of preventing Russian expansionism in the early twentieth century. At the time, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was traditionally based on military cooperation. Nonetheless, as the nature of geopolitics has shifted, traditional alliances are now believed to be insufficient in dealing with threats in the contemporary world which no longer exclusively come in a form of interstate rivalry. The introduction of a ‘New Type of Alliance’, thus, seems rational in the sense that it provides a more comprehensive approach to the re-interpretation of security in relation to modern threats.

“The New Type of Alliance [...] expands its focus to more than military cooperation by covering ‘all diversified security fields, including marine security, anti-terrorism, cybersecurity, intelligence cooperation, humanitarian disaster support, peacekeeping operations and joint development of defense equipment’.”

Recently, the term ‘New Type of Alliance’ has often been used to describe security ties between the two sea powers. According to the speech in 2013 by H.E. Keiichi Hayashi, Japan and the UK ‘are now nurturing a new partnership in the defense and security areas’. The major difference

between the traditional alliance and the New Type of Alliance is that while the former concentrates on military security, the latter expands its focus to more than military cooperation by covering ‘all diversified security fields, including marine security, anti-terrorism, cybersecurity, intelligence cooperation, humanitarian disaster support, peacekeeping operations and join development of defense equipment’. The various spheres of collaboration are reflected in the Japan-UK Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister Theresa May in 2017. Moreover, the New Type of Alliance is designed to function during peace rather than wartime. Nevertheless, considering the annexation of Crimea by Russia, China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, the brand new form of Anglo-Japanese alliance seeks a similar objective of that in the traditional one on the grounds that it remains a containment policy against an old expansionist Eurasian counterpart like Russia and, simultaneously, counterbalances rising China.

The transition from ‘hub-and-spokes’ to ‘network-type’ alliance is also essential in coping with the dynamic security architecture in Asia. In the hub-and-spokes alliance, Japan as a ‘spoke’ country is too dependent upon the ‘hub’ country: the US. In addition, having not been part of any multi-layered security structure like countries in Europe where NATO, FPDA, EU security alliance and bilateral security agreements are synchronously functioning, Japan under the Abe administration is committed to pursuing such kind of network-type alliance. One clear-cut example is the promotion of Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision by Japan together with other three countries in the ‘Quad’ group, namely the US, India and Australia.

[Source: Wikimedia Commons]

17 Ibid.
18 See footnote 16.
Still, there remain certain challenges towards the New Type of Alliance and the network-type Alliance. The following question has been raised regarding the New Type of Alliance: is it really new? Considering the definition of alliance provided by Stephen Walt as mentioned earlier, alliance is a ‘formal and informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’. However, the paradigm of ‘security’ has shifted from time to time, for instance, the security during the Cold War might be different from that after the 9.11 incident. If the goal of alliance formation by definition is to achieve any type of security, then the concept of alliance must have been evolving in accordance with the dynamic security by its own nature. Hence, should the alliance be termed as ‘New Type’ since what is new is not the alliance itself but rather threats?

In the case of the network-type alliance, another concern is whether Japan is truly able to move out of the US dominant hub-and-spokes feature. In consideration of the Japanese Constitution, Japan is not allowed to pursue any offensive actions. Bound by the NPT, the country is also obliged to restrain its nuclear ambition meaning that Japan’s national security must remain heavily dependent on the US umbrella like what it has been doing since the end of World War II. On this point, can Japan really escape from the hub-and-spoke alliance? Another point is that it is difficult to develop an Asia-based alliance seeing that the shared identity in Asia is not as strong as that in Europe. This is why, according to Hemmer and Katzenstein, there is no NATO in Asia. Cultural diversity and historical conflicts among Asian countries might hinder the integration of security network in the region.

5. Policy Recommendations

We argue that in order to enhance the UK-Japan security cooperation, two key legal issues should be considered. These are the restrictions imposed by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution) and the legal status of British soldiers and supplies.

Article 9 of the Constitution provides for the abandonment of war, renunciation of military power, and denial of the right to engage in war, despite the fact that Japan has a substantial army called the Self-Defense Forces. Constitutional debate continues to this day, but it falls outside of the scope of this brief to address the legality of the Self-Defense Forces. We focus here on the

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19 See footnote 13.
requirements for the exercise of collective self-defense and the relationship between UK-Japan security cooperation.21

5.1. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution

In July 2014, the Japanese government changed its existing view and allowed the right to collective self-defense. The government stated, 'The Government has reached a conclusion that not only when an armed attack against Japan occurs but also when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan's survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people's right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, and when there is no other appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people, use of force to the minimum extent necessary should be interpreted to be permitted under the Constitution as measures for self-defense in accordance with the basic logic of the Government’s view to date.’22 The right to collective self-defense is a right recognized under international law, and there are debates for its use, but there are requirements. Japan has its own requirements in addition to the requirements of international law.23

Since UK-Japan security cooperation has not yet formed a formal security alliance, it is unlikely that Article 9 of the Constitution will legally constrain UK-Japan security cooperation. However, in promoting Japan-UK security cooperation, it should be kept in mind that Japan has restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense.

5.2. Legal status of the UK personnel and supplies

To promote security cooperation, personnel exchanges and mutual provision of supplies such as food and ammunition are necessary.24 At that time, the legal status of the provision of Supplies and services becomes a problem in terms of standards and procedures.25 In addition to the United

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21 Of course, constitutional discussions, including the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces and the interpretation of the right to self-defense, are important. However, when discussing legal restrictions on security cooperation between Japan and Britain, discussing the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces is not necessarily useful because the scope of discussion is too broad. Therefore, on the premise of the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces, we will discuss legal restrictions other than Article 9 by discussing the relationship between collective self-defense rights and UK-Japan security cooperation.


23 杉原高嶺(2011)『国際法学講義[補訂]』、有斐閣、616～618頁。

24 A number of questions remain on this point: will the UK and Japan exchange personnel to promote security cooperation? Further investigation is required to determine it.

25 https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/navcol/SSG/review/7-2/7-2-08.pdf (2019/12/06)
States that concludes a security treaty, Japan signed Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Australia, followed by an ACSA with the UK. In the ACSA with UK, the Self-Defense Force is permitted to provide ammunition to the UK Army.

Then, what will the status of military personnel become in advance of security cooperation? Under customary international law, sovereign states are not subject to jurisdiction in other countries (State immunity). For example, in security cooperation, the question arises whether military personnel are subject to sovereign exemption. Therefore, an agreement to confirm their status will be necessary. Japan has already signed several, Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) including the United States, and aim to sign Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with Australia. Both agreements are intended to establish the legal status of military personnel. Such an agreement will be necessary for the promotion of UK-Japan security cooperation.

In this regard, there is a controversy about the extent to which sovereign immunity are subject. Traditionally, state acts and property have been subject to absolute immunity. Today, however, it is argued that state actions are divided into sovereign and private actions, sovereign actions are subject to state immunity, and private actions are subject to the jurisdiction of other states.
IV. North Korea: Implications for Regional Security and the Global Non-Proliferation Regime

Haruhiko Tsukamoto, Akiyuki Inoguchi, Sari Kawada, Seina Masumoto, Haruhiko Tsukamoto, Pawornwan Verapuchong, Onghena Hannelore

1. Introduction

Since Kim Jong-Un came to power in 2011, the North Korean regime has significantly reinforced its nuclear and ballistic capabilities. The North Korean nuclear arsenal now appears consubstantial to the regime. In the long term, the international community’s objective remains the denuclearization of North Korea, but in the short term, the main issue is to avoid any verbal escalation between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un which could lead to into uncertain outcomes, in the worst case, a military intervention on Korean soil. The DPRK, despite the opaque nature of its regime, is kind of predictable. For more than 20 years, the country has defied the efforts of the international community. It has remained uncompromising in its objective of developing nuclear weapons and associated vectors, nuclear energy so on. NK withdrew from the NPT in 2003, reported to have constructed a facility of uranium enrichment in 2010, restarted the Yongbyon reactor in 2015 and, most importantly, conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and 2017. These nuclear tests are the only ones to have been carried out since the beginning of the 21st century.

In this paper, we aim to analyze the implications North Korea has towards regional security and the global non-proliferation regime, through the following research question: How can we achieve a non-proliferation deal?

In order to answer it, we have laid out three research sub-questions.

- What is the current situation regarding North Korea and its regional security?
- Why is it deemed difficult to achieve a denuclearization deal currently?
- What impacts does it have if North Korea becomes a permanent nuclear state?
2. Current situation analysis regarding North Korea and regional security

2.1. What exactly was the initial incentive for North Korea to go nuclear?

The motivations of a state to acquire or not acquire nuclear weapons are diverse. Nuclear weapons are not only tools for national security; they are also political objects of considerable importance in internal debates and internal bureaucratic struggles, weapons that ensure the security of the regime as well as national security.¹ In the case of North Korea, they have become genuine weapons of identity, political weapons that strengthen the legitimacy of the regime, increase the authority of the leader, consolidate the hereditary system, legitimize the sacrifices of the population, strengthen the internal cohesion of the country and stimulate the national morale.²

2.2. Why was North Korea successful in pursuing its nuclear program?

As international security scholar Richard Betts has observed, no state has ever developed nuclear weapons by accident or inadvertence. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions date to the Korean War in the 1950s. Since 1956, the Soviet Union began training North Korean scientists and engineers, giving them ‘basic knowledge’ to initiate a nuclear program.³ In 1989 with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost the security guarantees and economic support that had sustained it for 45 years. Also, since the establishment of the North Korean state in September 1948, the US and the DPRK have never experienced normal relations; rather they are tainted by the experience of the Korean War. The US has always treated DPRK as an enemy. These relationships with other countries have enhanced the anxiety of the DPRK, resulting in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. International relations scholar Jacques Hymans argues that nuclear weapons development derives from deeply held emotional beliefs of leaders about power, identity, and risk. He characterizes the belief system associated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons as ‘oppositional nationalism’.⁴ Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il (despite their differences in temperament and

experience) both fit the profile. The internal regime of the DPRK is able to put a large amount of technological and material resources to the development of nuclear weapons. Thus both outside and inside factors lead to the result of the DPRK nuclear issue.

2.3. How did North Korea change the dynamics of regional security

In this section, we focus on the impact of the North Korea issue on regional security. First we examine the factors which can make North Korea a bigger threat and the relationship between NK and the rest of Asia.

North Korea has threatened regional security for a while. Its threat has been increasing since Kim Jong-un became the Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2012. There are mainly two factors regarding the North Korean threat to regional security. The first one is nuclear testing. North Korea has carried out tests 4 times under the Kim Jong-un regime (2012-present), while only twice under Kim Jong-il regime (1994-2011). It is possible for us to estimate the scale of it by referring to the magnitude of the earthquakes that take place in Punggye-RI, a North Korean nuclear testing ground. The magnitude has been getting larger, thus, there is almost no doubt that the scale of the nuclear test has been also getting larger with time. Furthermore, according to a report by Japanese Ministry of Defense, it can be said that North Korea already succeeded to build nuclear warheads small enough to fit on its ballistic missiles, considering the result of 5th and 6th nuclear test.

The second factor is NK missile technology. Launching a ballistic missile that can fly from thousands of km to approximately 10,000 km, is difficult to intercept due to its extremely high speed. It is usually launched with nuclear warhead as weapons of mass destruction because of its low accuracy. In the era of Kim Jong-un (2012-present) the number of launched ballistic missile is 65, while in the era of Kim Jong-il (1994-2011) it was 16.5 As a matter of fact, it is possible for North Korea to target Asian countries including Japan launching intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Moreover, even the US can be within the range of North Korea’s new ICBM (the Hwasong 15).6

As a conclusion, North Korea threatens the regional security by carrying out nuclear tests and launching ballistic missiles, the potential impact of which would be huge because North Korea

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already succeeded in making nuclear warheads small enough to put on its ballistic missiles. Even though Kim Jong-un announced its intention for complete denuclearization and suspension of launching ICBM, this threat still remains unless CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization) is achieved.

2.4. What is the current situation regarding its negotiations between the US/South Korea and North Korea?

In the second Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, which was held on 27-28 February 2019, both parties could not settle for an agreement and the negotiations essentially collapsed, with the two leaders leaving earlier than originally planned. Since then, there has been a summit in Stockholm, but the result was more or less the same. What was the reason for the collapse? In this part, rather than going over the specific dates and process of the negotiations, we try to assess why the latest negotiation ended up in a breakdown by analyzing the current interests of both the US and North Korea.

In the negotiations of Hanoi, the USA insisted on the ‘big for big’ deal, according to which North Korea should achieve a complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) first in order to get the US to completely lift sanctions. North Korea, however, rejected this idea and instead suggested that it would abandon the Byeong Yeon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and its surrounding facilities, in return for the lifting of five categories of UN sanctions. The US instantly dismissed this suggestion, as they believed that North Korea would not abandon all the facilities, including the underground facility located in north-west Byeong Yeon, as North Korea never referenced how and which part of the Byeong Yeon facility they would actually abandon.

Although the exact negotiation process is not clear, from the difference in demands it is not difficult to conclude that the summit was bound to fail from the very beginning, at least in terms of pushing a non-proliferation deal forward. So, why were their demands so different, and why could they not come to a concession?

The ultimate goal of the USA and North Korea can be described as being entirely opposite. While the USA seeks the complete denuclearization of North Korea, North Korea only seem to be interested in achieving a so-called ‘symbolic denuclearization’. We saw this clearly in the Hanoi

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summit, as the US insisted on the so-called CVID. When we turn our eyes to North Korea, it is quite clear that they have no intention of denuclearization, at least unilaterally. As we have analyzed above, North Korea has perpetuated its nuclear program primarily to bring the USA to the negotiating table in order to demand the safety of its regime and a security guarantee of North Korea. North Korea will not compromise on these two demands, because the very reason why North Korea initiated the nuclear development is to ensure these two core interest would be actualized.

“The maximum amount North Korea is willing to concede is a symbolic denuclearization.”

Given this context, the maximum amount North Korea would concede is a symbolic denuclearization, as stated above. Symbolic denuclearization is, by abandoning/halting some of its nuclear programs (by abandoning a nuclear facility and showing that to foreign press, as an example) a means to show that they have no hostile intent, and lowering the perception of threat within the international society. However, they would still hold on to the nuclear program, in order to pursue their goal, which is the survival of the Kim regime and the security guarantee. The latter demand could be extremely hard for USA to concede, as North Korea is apparently not only demanding the USA to withdraw its strategic assets from South Korea, but also from Guam and Hawaii, according to certain sources. This is partly the reason why the negotiations has been met with hardships.

When we turn our attention to the USA however, there is another factor that might make CVID even more difficult to achieve: namely, the dynamics of domestic politics. When explaining the actions and negotiations of the USA and President Trump, we must consider the element of domestic politics, and particularly for Trump, the 2020 elections. Trump often portrays the freeze of joint US and South Korean military exercises in exchange for a continued freeze on North Korean nuclear and missile testing as a huge success in his foreign policy. This has raised

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questions regarding his future stance towards North Korea, however, with many experts raising concerns that the USA might make a concession the would benefit the USA and the USA only.

One major concern, especially for Japan is that the USA might allow North Korea to have nuclear artillery as long as they halt the development and usage of ICBM, which has the capability to reach the USA (practically allowing short ranged missiles). This would cause Japan and potentially South Korea to constantly be under the threat of North Korea, without the protection of the USA. Although it is very unlikely that North Korea would actually initiate an attack on these states, Japan and South Korea will be more vulnerable to the threats North Korea possesses. Therefore, even though the USA as a whole would probably continue to look for a complete denuclearization, President Trump might pursue something different which would boost his domestic reputation. This is another ongoing concern regarding the non-proliferation deal with North Korea.

The dynamics within domestic politics, not to mention the wide gap between the two parties’ interests/goals when it comes to the term ‘denuclearization’, has led to the breakdown in these negotiations. Moreover, even if they do come to an agreement, it would much likely be far from an actual complete denuclearization deal.

Finally, we should also consider the worst case, a scenario where North Korea gains a position as a permanent nuclear state as a result of negotiations breakdown. In the next section, we are going to analyze the potential problems and detrimental harms caused by North Korea becoming a permanent nuclear state.

3. Policy issues: the effects of North Korea perpetuating its nuclear program and disregarding the non-proliferation regime

3.1. Scenario: Failure of US negotiations; North Korea going permanently nuclear

In this section, we examine the possible effects of this scenario on North Korea, and predict their possible actions. Then, we assess the US’s position in case of a failed negotiation.

First of all, in terms of military action, in such a situation, it is very unlikely to think that North Korea would choose to attack the US. This is because the US overrides North Korea in not just only the military aspect, but from all aspects by far. Therefore, there is no incentive for North Korea to attack the US taking into consideration the consequences it could have. Furthermore, it can be said that attacks on South Korea and Japan would also not happen. Considering the survival of its state,
North Korea would probably avoid actions which can either create huge criticism within the international society, or provoke counter attacks which could destroy North Korea. As a matter of fact, it is possible to say that North Korea has not been developing its nuclear weapons as counter measures for Japan or South Korea but rather, it has gone nuclear as a result of it wanting to compromise with the US. What is more, countries like the US, Japan and South Korea have all established opportunities for negotiations with North Korea, and there is no urgent incentive for North Korea to take the initiative in aggressively attacking another state.

On the other hand, the damage the US will receive once negotiations fail is thought to be considerable. Firstly, its deterrence capabilities will show ineffective, which could prompt many countries around the world to shift policies. For example, countries hostile to the US like Iran might decide to go nuclear too. This would certainly further complicate the non-proliferation policies and cooperation done currently. The US will also lose trust and credibility from its allies. Countries like Japan and South Korea will probably have to reconsider their policies as a result of this.

In the worst case scenario for the US, China will gain leadership of the negotiations with North Korea, resulting in the US’s loss of influence as a major power in the Asian region. In fact, China is currently the only country which can effectively impose sanctions to North Korea leveraging on North Korea being heavily dependent on China in terms of trade. Therefore, these assumptions on the aftermath of a failed negotiation are very possible, which means it could have a significantly negative effect on the US.

3.2. Impact on the non-proliferation regime

What will happen if North Korea perpetuates its nuclear program and does not join the non-proliferation regime? It will have a huge impact on both the non-proliferation regime and the regional security in Asia, as examined in this section.
North Korea withdrew from NPT in 2003. However, this withdrawal remains controversial because it failed the three-month notice requirement and there was a question that North Korea has a right to withdraw. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarded North Korea as a country under NPT and the United Nation Security Council also demanded a retraction of the declaration of withdrawable, not requested to back to NPT. Therefore, a North Korea with nuclear capabilities has large influence on the non-proliferation regime and countries joining NPT.

There are some countries who had nuclear weapon under NPT, such as South Africa, Libya and Ukraine. Also some are under non-proliferation process like Iran. However, if North Korea is recognized as a nuclear state, these countries might consider non-proliferation regime is unfair and try to get nuclear again. It would also lose trust for the US-led order. Countries under the US nuclear umbrella might consider to go nuclear too. Nuclear armament already come up in some country. For example, it became controversial in Germany in 2018, because the trust for US decreased. Australia also had discussion about nuclear armament, in response to the US’s perceived disrespect for their alliance and the rise of China. So, non-proliferation process in North Korea can destabilize the non-proliferation regime, which must be safeguarded to maintain the status quo.

3.3. Impact on South Korean and Japanese nuclear policies

We consider here the possibility that a North Korean permanent nuclearization could push South Korea and Japan into nuclear armament. These two countries share some characteristics, such as being under the umbrella of US and near to NK; both have stuck to a non-nuclear policy because of faith in the US’s huge nuclear power.

However, today, the situation is changing. Donald Trump criticizes these countries because he thinks that the content of Security Treaty or financial burden are unfair to America. As a consequence, South Korea in particular is afraid of the decline in the quality of Mutual Defense Treaty and many Koreans would agree to a nuclear armament of the country: a poll conducted by Gallup Korea in 2016 indicated that nearly 60 percent of South Koreans support the country’s development of its own nuclear weapons. NPT says that ‘Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country’ and some Korean think it will be applied for South Korea. But, of course, it remains unlikely for South Korea to develop its own nuclear power because of the high costs.

Similar circumstances are also applicable to Japan, with the big difference that public opinion in Japan is strongly influenced by the nuclear-disarmament movement because of Japan’s historical legacy as the only country ever experiencing the atomic bomb. As a result, there are almost no discussions on nuclear armament issues.
As analyzed above, there are detrimental effects linked to the potential permanent nuclearization of North Korea. Therefore, a deal that would persuade North Korea to pursue the road of denuclearization must be achieved. In our last section, we advance some suggestions on how we can nudge North Korea to shift in the direction of denuclearization, based on the assessment of North Korea’s past behaviour.

4. Policy Recommendations

4.1. Why a unilateral denuclearization deal is unrealistic? Past multilateral approach towards the denuclearization talks

- **NPT (December 1985)**
  In response to the request of the Soviet Union, the DPRK joined NPT. At first, North Korea did not agree with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), but afterwards signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992, thus accepting IAEA’s inspections. Its first inspection suspected that North Korea’s nuclear development was at a higher level than what they reported. In response to this findings, IAEA requested a special inspection, but North Korea rejected and announced its withdrawal from NPT in 1993, as mentioned above. In the end, neither NPT nor IAEA had influence on North Korea due to their weak legal enforcement provisions. In the same year, they deferred its withdrawal from NPT, but their relations remained strained. After that, North Korea changed its policy, accepting one-on-one negotiation with the US. Through their conversations, they agreed on the ‘Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ in 1994. Within the regime, North Korea promised to stay in the NPT regime and to resume accepting IAEA’s inspection. However, North Korea quickly resumed nuclear testing and was uncooperative to IAEA’s inspection. In 2001, upon George W. Bush’s inauguration as President, his diplomatic attitude provoked North Korea’s anger (North Korea harshly criticized being included in the so called ‘axis of evil’). Finally in response to ‘uranium concentration suspicion’ suggestion, North Korea refused IAEA inspection and left the NPT again in 2003. US-North Korea regime was broken down. Once again, multilateral regime failed here.

- **Six-Party Talks**
  After North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, they resumed nuclear-related activities. Under the strained US-North Korea relationship, China emerged as a positive player. Three months after North Korea withdrawal, thanks to China’s active role, Three-Party Talks was held, including the US, North Korea, and China. Also, in August in 2003, Six-Party Talks was set up as a multilateral regime towards denuclearization involving the US, North Korea, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia. They reached a kind of consensus as a ‘summary’
but this document did not have legal force, thus it was not so effective. It was not until the 4th Six-Party Talks that the countries agreed on a joint statement. In that statement, North Korea promised to abandon all the nuclear weapons and to rejoin NPT/IAEA. Some experts point out that it was the US-DPRK talks that ensured the success of the 4th Six-Party Talks. The Bush administration was reluctant to join one-on-one talks, but considering the past three meetings, they might have complied. At the same time, it is obvious that what made the denuclearization talk stall was also the US. On the one hand the US joined the multilateral regime and contribute to make a joint statement, on the other hand, they worked to impose economic sanction on North Korea. Such attitude provoked North Korean strong distrust for US and made further negotiation difficult. Afterwards, there were two more six-party talks until 2008, but there was no particular progress.

As we can see, this multilateral constitution is greatly influenced by US-North Korea relations, this is actually ‘bilateral’ rather than ‘multilateral’ after all. Of course, Six-Party talks itself could be meaningful, but obviously, it is not until US-North Korea relationships improved/progressed that Six-Party Talks could become effective. All in all, what is needed for the time being should be a bilateral diplomatic framework between the US and North Korea.

- US preference for one-on-one talks
  John Bolton told Fox News Sunday this April: ‘The United States is not trying to exclude other nations from nuclear talks with Pyongyang, but I think it’s not what our preference is’. Following this statement, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested the revival of multilateral approach to the denuclearization talks but Bolton referred to Six-Party Talks as something ‘which failed in the past’ and did not show positive attitude towards multilateral talks.

4.2. What kind of negotiations/deals are feasible and beneficial for all parties?

4.2.1. Can we achieve a bilateral deal? If so, how?

If we consider the three points outlined below, we argue that a bilateral deal with North Korea is achievable. NK claimed that they would abandon the nuclear facilities of Yongbyon based on the verification of the US (not IAEA). This shows that NK is seeking ‘Nuclear arms control system’ with the US, which the US and the Soviet Union made during Cold War. So, we have to see US as

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the main negotiator of any deal with NK. However, other countries like South Korea, Japan and China also have a say.

1) Integration of the definition of ‘Denuclearization’
NK wants a ‘symbolic partial denuclearization’. A ‘complete denuclearization’ is not an option because nuclear weapons are so important to the security of regime and it is too dangerous to abandon all of the nukes at once. Nuclear power is the superior guarantee of the regime’s survival to unreliable deal or consensus for them. In the conversation with The Diplomat on ‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb’, Kenneth Waltz also says that nukes are the only peacekeeping weapons that the world has ever known. However, at the second summit meeting between NK and the US, president Trump suggested ‘big-for-big’ which required the complete denuclearization to have the economic sanctions fully lifted in turn. There is a huge gap on the understanding of the definition of ‘denuclearization’ and this is the reason why negotiations failed to conclude. To succeed in the deal of denuclearization, the US has to talk about the definition of ‘denuclearization’ with NK first, accepting the fact that a ‘Big-for-big’ deal is unrealistic in consideration of the security of regime of NK. We suggest the US pursues a ‘phased denuclearization’ approach, with a clear timeframe of the steps which NK has to follow.

2) Political sustainability
To succeed in denuclearization, the deal should have ‘political sust ainability’. It means that the deal should be valid for a long time even if regime change happens. If the content of the deal become invalid when the regime changes, it will be confusing, and the deal would not be reliable anymore – giving NK no incentive for abandoning its nukes. If president Trump strikes a terrible deal that is detrimental to the national interest of the US and its allies, the Democratic Party would have a big chance to attack him and regime change will be likely to happen. The deal should consider the perspective of the national interest of the US, NK and allies and be supported by all of them. To be supported by allies, US has to talk about the denuclearization of NK with its own allies (Japan and South Korea) as well as China.

3) Appropriate balance between the progress of denuclearization measures and incentives for North Korea
Nukes are paramount to the survival of the North Korean regime. Therefore, NK will not abandon nukes without some incentives. For NK, incentives are the security guarantees from US and economic advantages (which means lifting of the economic sanction). However, the incentives should not be too much or too little. At the second summit meeting between NK and the US, NK requested the lifting of five of the economic sanctions which have been imposed by the UN Security Council resolutions since 2016. This ‘partial lifting of economic sanctions’ included the restriction of exports of fossil fuels and oils, therefore if it was accepted by the US it would have made too much of a concession – with a negative
effect on the process of denuclearization. President Trump’s decision of refusing the offer from NK was correct and made the process of denuclearization feasible.

4.2.2. Our recommendation

According to the discussion above, we suggest that three points should be fulfilled to achieve a denuclearization deal:

1) **Bilateral deal between the US and NK**

   The failure of past approach of NPT and Six Parties shows that the unilateral deal is not realistic, and that NK prefers bilateral deals to multilateral ones. Also, NK is probably seeking a ‘Nuclear arms control system’ arrangement with the US similar to the one in place during the Cold War.

2) **Phased denuclearization**

   For NK, nukes are the only peacekeeping weapons that they have already known, making it too dangerous for them to abandon them at once. So, ‘big-for-big’ is unrealistic and we suggest the phased denuclearization with giving the appropriate amount of incentives.

3) **Cooperation between the allies**

   We suggested a bilateral approach focusing on the US and NK. However, Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries are the ones that are going to be most exposed to the danger of security if the deal of denuclearization fails. It would be too risky to leave the negotiation of denuclearization to the US only. Therefore, Asian countries should have the chance to talk with the US before the deal with NK. They have to discuss the definition of ‘denuclearization’, national interests of each country and appropriate balance between the incentives for NK and the progress of denuclearization measures.
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